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Plato’s Hypothesis and the Upward Path
Richard Robinson, in his stimulating and searching book on Plato’s Earlier 
Dialectic, has a section entitled ’’Hypothesizing a Higher Hypothesis.’’·*■ Like 
other recent scholars, he takes it for granted that in Plato’s scheme of hypo­
thetical reasoning as developed in the Phaedo and the Republic. the more general 
hypothesis, the hypothesis bordering more closely upon the άνυπδθετον, is the 
higher hypothesis. That is to say, in a deductive system, as the Latin base 
of the term indicates, the premises are thought of as located higher than the 
conclusions. In this, Robinson follows not only what he conceives to be 
Plato’s own hints, but also the usage of Aristotle: "By ’upward' I mean the
ascent to the more universal, by ’downward' the descent to the more particular.’’2 
In this footnote on terminology, Aristotle is talking about κατηγορίαi, predi­
cates in syllogistic reasoning. It might at first be supposed that ανω and 
κάτω are references to the purely formal structure of the syllogism itself 
rather than to the structure of the reality signified by the terms of the 
syllogism. 3 But other passages make sufficiently clear that the reference is 
indeed to higher and lower BeingΛ  For Aristotle, the movement of the syllo­
gism is downward because we demonstrate certain conclusions from certain 
assumptions —  often, paradoxically, called κείμενα —  of a more universal 
character, τδ άνωθεν is a regular term for the superordinate genus,5 In his 
discussion of Plato, also, τα ανω and τα κάτω always refer to genus and species«? 
It is not surprising, therefore, that Aristotle's logical terminology is gen­
erally thought to be based on Plato's. The facts, however, do not entirely 
bear out this view. In this paper I shall attempt to show that Aristotle's 
logical terminology, ontologically conditioned or determined as it obviously 
is, contrasts with that of Plato, who, on the whole, with perhaps one excep­
tion, was very careful not to introduce unwarranted ontological perspectives 
into matters of logic,7·
To begin with, it will be convenient to note the implications of Platonic 
diaeresis. It is true that this operation of Platonic dialectic is not the 
same as the logical progress from premise to inference. Genus and species are 
ontological rather than logical terms. And yet it may be assumed that if 
Plato's logic anticipated the Aristotelian distinction between the higher and 
the lower, the same topographical perspective should also be apparent in the 
area studied by diaeresis. It will be all the more striking, then, if we can 
show that diaeresis does not make provision for a vertical hierarchy of Being, 
or, at least, that Plato's discussion does not suggest that such a hierarchy 
is reflected in the diaeretic procedure so as to shape it in its image.
Modern discussions of Plato’s analysis via division and collection often 
refer to higher or superordinate and lower or subordinate γένη, μέγιστα γένη 
is sometimes rendered as "highest forms."® And elegant stemmata are devised.
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spreading from the 'top of the page to the bottom, to reproduce the up- or 
downward movement of the dialectical process. But if we look closely at the 
relevant passages, both at those where Plato practices the technique of 
division and collection, and at those in which he states his method, we find 
that the directional implications of the process are either indifferent or 
horizontal. That is to say, to the extent that Plato conceives the diaeretic 
procedure as moving, it moves on one plane or level.
Here is a listing of the principal passages in question, with the key 
words, the topographical orientation implied, and occasional further comment.
Phaedrus 265D - 266C: diaeresis operates by dividing the entity to be
analyzed into a left (In’ άριστερδ τεμνδμενος) and a right part (είς τά èv 
δεξι£). Orientation: not vertical. Hence such terms as "sub-form" and
"Ínfima species" should be eliminated from the discussion of diaeresis 
passages.9
Sophist 253ϊ analysis consists of showing which γένη associate with one 
another and which do not (... ποια ... συμφωνεί ... ποια ... ού δέχεται) and 
which γένη have another "stretched through" them (διατεταμένην) so as to con­
tain them (περιεχομένας). Orientation: indifferent.
Politicus 262A - 263B: analysis should operate by cutting through the
middle (δια μέσον ... Ιέναι τέμνοντας). Orientation: inconclusive.,
Politicus 268C: analysis involves disengaging the item to be isolated
from connected and related γένη "poured around" it (περικεχυμένους αύτ$). 
Orientation: indifferent.
Politicus 275E: the choice of the proper inclusive concept will allow us
to "wrap up" (περικαλόπτειν) one species along with the others with which it 
constitutes a genus. Orientation: indifferent.
Politicus 285A-C: analysis requires orderly procedure, especially the
grouping of separate elements into the one comprehensive genus to which they 
belong (τα οίκεϊα ... ερξας ... περιβ&ληται). Orientation: indifferent.
Philebus 16D - 18D: the analogy of grammatical and musical analysis
shows that philosophical analysis must interpose various stages between the 
conception of the one and the conception of the infinite number containing 
the one (μίαν Ιδέαν περί παντδς ... Ινουσαν). Orientation: indifferent.
Sophist 265E - 266a : In a progressive division of a γένος into 2, 4, 8,
etc,, parts, the division is made alternately by drawing a vertical line 
(κατά πλάτος) and a horizontal line (κατα μήκος). Orientation: indifferent.
Other references could be added, but the result would be the same, name­
ly, that logical implication is regarded by Plato not as subsumption but 
either as containment ■—  that is to say, the genus envelops the species —  or 
as division —  that is, the species constitutes the right or left half of the 
genus. The movement experienced in the transition from genus to species or, 
in the case of collection, from species to genus is not in a single instance 
characterized as a descent from or an ascent to the genus.
3One possible answer to this would be that the ε’ίδη may not be organized 
in a vertical hierarchy, but that the Ideas of Plato's middle dialogues are, 
and that such terms as δπδθεσις, &ρχή and έπαγωγή, with their well-known 
connotations, speak palpably for a vertical perspective* έπαγωγή may be dis­
pensed with out of hand. Even Robinson, who insists that Plato practices 
έπαγωγή, admits that he is not aware of it as a logical procedure, and has 
in fact no term for it. Does Plato use induction? The boundary line sepa­
rating induction from analogy is of course tenuous. But "all that business 
about cobblers and cleaners and cooks and doctors," as Callicles calls it, 
suggests that when Plato refers to practical reality, he appeals to some 
sort of intuition rather than the powers of reasoning. However that may be, 
Plato does not use the term έπαγωγή, and that relieves us of the need to dis­
cuss it.
As for ύπδθεσις and its near-equivalent άρχή, the situation is very com­
plex. Robinson himself has done much to shed light on the obscure standing 
of hypothesis in Plato. According to him, the case is the reverse of that 
Obtaining in the matter of induction: "Plato discussed but rarely used the
hypothetical method," Since, therefore, we have Plato's methodology but 
little of his application, obscurities and even inconsistencies in the former 
leave matters somewhat doubtful. This much, however, is clear. A hypothesis 
is something posited —  cf. Aristotle's κείμενον — as a preliminary assump­
tion, as a basis·*·® for further logical operations which may either analyze 
the assumption itself or depend on it for the analysis of other assumptions. 
Normally the latter is the case, i.e., the hypothesis is a premise rather 
than a demonstrand.*-*· Broadly speaking, then, "hypothesizing is positing 
with a view to future action." Often the assumption which forms the point 
of departure for further investigation is a κοινδν άξιώμενον, a statement 
tacitly assumed to be true by all.
The important question which now arises is this: does the ύπδ-part of
the word δπδθεσις signify that this basic assumption is conceived of as ly­
ing under and thus supporting the logical edifice constructed from it? Let 
us call this the U-(= under) perspective, to contrast with the A- (= above) 
perspective whereby the assumption is conceived of as lying above the conclu­
sion, Now on the face of it, it would seem likely that the ύπδ points to a 
U-perspective. But according to Robinson and most Platonists that cannot be, 
for a hypothesis to be useful must refer to a higher reality than the propo­
sitions deduced from it. Hence Plato's hypothesis, like Aristotle's premise, 
and equally paradoxically so, must be pictured as vaulting above the conclu­
sions and deductions which aré suspended below it.
To render this unlikely notion palatable, Robinson undertakes, in the 
wake of Burnet,*-2 to demonstrate that the first sense of hypothesis was 
intellectual, not architectural or physical in any way.13 His reasoning is 
that if the word had ever "borne some such sense as 'physical foundation', 
Plato would hardly have written the phrase &λλην αυ ύπδθεσιν ύποθέμενος ήτις 
των άνωθεν βελτίστη φαίνοιτο (Phd. 101D)j for it would have carried the 
absurd suggestion of 'placing as base whatever base seemed best of those 
above'!" As we shall see later, Robinson's interpretation of the Phaedo 
passage, though commonly accepted, is not the only possible one. At 
Republic 511B, where Plato does understand hypothesis in the sense of a
4physical stepping stone —  άλλα τ$ οντι δποθδσεις, οΧον έπιβάσεις τε καί 
δρμάς ... —  Burnet and Robinson suspect a pun. But even granted that Plato 
is speaking humorously here, the passage proves that he felt the δπδ-part of 
the term strongly enough to allow his conception of logical procedure, at 
this point, to be guided by it or at least to make allowance for it.
Though there is no uncontested case of Plato using δπδθεσις in the sense 
of "foundation,” other writers supply us with the required supplementary in­
formation. Closest to that of Plato is, perhaps, the usage of the Hippocratic 
writers. For instance, the writer On Ancient Medicine (chs. 1; 13J 15) uses 
δπδθεσις to refer to one of the opposites —  το θερμήν and τδ ψυχρόν, etc.
— ■ alleged to determine health, as well as to the assumption of the operation 
of such an opposite. The spatial perspective is not entirely clear, but it 
cannot be doubted that these opposites should be ranged closely with the Em- 
pedoclean Ριζώματα, and as ¡Ριζώματα they would of course realize their δπδ- 
fünction to the fullest.
Other writers who capitalize on the δπδ-force of the word δπδθεσις are 
Aeschines (3.76) and Polybius (15.35.2). But our clearest evidence for the 
dynamic implications of δπδθεσις occurs in a popular text, and a simile, to 
boot. Demosthenes 2.10.5: "Just as a house and a ship and other such
structures require the strongest foundations, so the άρχαί and δποθέσεις of 
actions must be true and just." Here there can be no doubt; a hypothesis 
is analogous to the foundation of a house, not to its roof. And this, I 
suggest, was the natural significance of the word δπδθεσις, before its mean­
ing was obscured in a manner to be described directly; a foundation upon 
which to erect a superstructure of some sort, a broad basis on which things 
of lesser extent but greater concreteness are supported,^
Logical progression, therefore, naturally leads from the hypothesis below 
to the inferences above. But there is another way of looking at logical pro­
gression. It may be pictured as leading forward horizontally from the start 
to the finish of a sentence or argument. This perspective is well illustrated 
by the usage of Xenophon Memor. 4.6.13: έπι την δπδθεσιν έπανηγεν άν πάντα
τον λδγον ωδε .... The understanding is that the hypothesis, the subject or 
foundation of the discussion, had been voiced, or should have been voiced, at 
the beginning of the conversation. A "getting down to fundamentals" is, 
therefore, a "going back" to the beginning. Here the horizontal advance of 
the discussion has imposed its stamp on the topography of δπδθεσις. In most 
cases it is a relatively simple matter to distinguish between this perspective 
and the perspective which mirrors the structural concept outlined above.
After these few preliminary remarks, we must now turn to some of the 
passages in which Plato exemplifies his understanding of δπδθεσις. Again our 
list is representative rather than exhaustive. As before, I shall state the 
references, cite crucial words, and indicate the contribution of the passage 
to the subject under discussion. The actual word δπδθεσις does not occur in 
all of the passages cited. Sometimes αρχή takes its place; sometimes there 
is no technical term to be found. Not all of the passages describe what we 
would term a logical procedure. But the process envisaged is always the 
same; the movement from general assumption to specific conclusion. It is 
this movement which according to the usual interpretation should be a move­
ment άνωθεν κάτω.
5Gorgias 454C2 ff,: ... ένα ... συ τα σαυτου κατά την ύπδθεσιν ...
περαίν^ς. The perspective is undetermined.
Charm. 171D2-3: ··· δ' έξ άρχης ύπετιθέμεθα ·.»· Perspective undetermined.
Protag. 339D2-4: ··· πρώτον-·..* ύπέθετο ..., δλίγον δε ... είς τδ
πρδσθεν προελθ&ν .... Perspective horizontal,
Crito 48Ε5 and 49D6: αρχή and αρχομαν are used of the hypothesis (here
not so called) from which further statements are deduced, άρχή is seen as 
the beginning of a δδδς. Perspective undetermined.
Cratylus 428D5-8: δεν ... θαμα μεταστρέφεσθαι έπί τα προειρημένα, καν
πειρασθαι ... βλέπενν άμα πρδσσω καί δπίσσω. "Looking backward" refers to 
revising prior agreements, "looking forward" to inferring or deducing results. 
Perspective horizontal.
Cratylus 43ÓD4-7: δεν δή περί της άρχής «·· τον πολύν λδγον είναι καν
την πολλήν σκέψιν ε’ντε δρθως είτε μη ύπδκειται* έκείνης δε έξετασθείσης Ικανως, 
τα λοιπά φαίνεσθαι έκείν^ έπδμενα. Perspective undetermined.
Meno 86É3ff.î ... έξ ύποθέσεως αύτδ σκοπεΐσθαι, είτε διδακτόν έστιν 
είτε δπωσουν. In this interesting passage which features a number of hypotheses 
in action, with the result that all of them are either demonstrated or refuted 
or both,' the perspective is undetermined throughout.
P a m . 128D5-6: ... έτι γελοιότερα πάσχοι αν αυτών ή δπδθεσις, εΐ πολλά
έστιν, η ή του έν εΤναι, είτις Ικανως έπεξίοι. Perspective undetermined.
Perm. 135Ε9 - 13&Α2: ... μή μδνον εί έστιν έκαστον Υποτιθέμενον σκοπείν
τα συμβαίνοντα έκ της ύποθέσεως, άλλα καί εί μή έστι τδ αύτδ τούτο ύπο- 
τίθεσθαι.... Perspective undetermined. -^5
Timaeus 61D3-4: ύποθετέον δή πρδτερον θάτερα, τα δ' ύποτεθέντα έπάνιμεν
αδθις. Perspective probably horizontal.
Timaeus 53D4—7î ταδτην δε πυρδς άρ^ήν ... ύποτιθέμεθα κατά τδν μετ’ 
ανάγκης είκδτα λδγον πορευδμενοι. τας δ έτι τοδτων άρχας άνωθεν θεδς 
οίδεν .... This last sentence poses a problem on which neither Taylor nor 
Cornford comments. The question is whether άνωθεν goes with the preceding 
words, and is to be construed with έτι, or whether τάς δ έτι τούτων άρχάς 
forms a self-contained unit, as Archer-Hind certainly understood it, in which 
case άνωθεν signifies the position from which the god exercises his knowledge.
If the latter interpretation is adopted, as I suspect it should, άνωθεν ... 
οίδε would be parallel to such an expression as Theaet. 175D3 βλέπων ... 
άνωθεν. Translators who have favored the former interpretation have usually 
ended up blunting the force of άνωθεν and substituting innocuous terns like 
"remote" or "principal." —  Hence, probably, perspective undetermined.
Laws 812A4-'5î κατά μεν τήν ύπδθεσιν, ώ ξένε, έμοιγε ού φαινδμεθα έκτος 
πορεύεσθαι των ύποτεθέντων λόγων .... Perspective undetermined.
6Phaedo 100A3 - 101E3: άλλ* οδν δη ταδτ$ γε δρμησα, και δποθέμενος . ·* δ*
μεν &ν μσι δοκη τοδτ^ συμφωνειν τίθημι &ς άληθη ’όντα .... 101D3: et δέ τις
αύτης της δποθέσεως εχοιτο, χαίρειν έφης αν ... εως αν τα άπ* έκείνης 
δρμηθέντα σκέψαιο .... έπειδη δε έκείνης αύτης δέοι σε διδδναι λδγον, 
άσαύτως άν διδοίης, άλλην αδ ύπδθεσιν δποθέμενος ^τις των άνωθεν βέλτιστη 
φαίνοιτο, εως έπί τι Ικανόν ελθοις .... ¥e should note that this last passage, 
as so many others dealing with hypothesis, employs a verb of motion or pro­
gression, in this case δρμδω and δρμ&ομαι. The usual sense of the word is "to 
move forward," in a horizontal direction. The direction may occasionally be 
vertical; but in that case it is likely to be upward rather than downward, for 
the simple reason that the word denotes willed rather than automatic motion.
And yet in this passage δρμδομαί has been interpreted as downward motion, the 
reason being that hypothesis in the Phaedo is clearly associated with the 
Ideas, and the Ideas are highest. However, the argument is not from Ideas to 
sensibles and back but, according to Socrates, from Ideas to Ideas; and there 
is no evidence to indicate, at least in this passage, that one Idea is higher 
than another. Thus the more comprehensive or basic hypothesis should not be 
pictured as lying above a hypothesis entailed by it or generated by it. Never 
does Plato use such a phrase as έκ 60ο δποθέσεων ηρτηταi^ 6 or a similar verb 
of suspension in connexion with the hypothesis method. But we can go further 
than that, and suggest that in the Phaedo Plato seems to conceive of the 
premise as lying below the conclusion, that is to say, that Plato adopts the 
U-perspective, This emerges from the words: άλλην αδ δπδθεσιν δποθέμενος
ητις των άνωθεν βελτίστη φαίνοιτο . ...^
Plato*s language here points to the notion of an inverted pyramid, with 
the more comprehensive hypothesis lying at the bottom, and the δρμηθέντα 
radiating upward from each hypothesis, τα άνωθεν is merely another way of 
saying τά δρμηθέντα. We translate as follows: "placing below hypothesis X
another hypothesis Y which would seem to be the best (hypothesis) of the 
(propositions) above it," that is, which would account best for X and other 
statements on the same level. Usually the genitive των άνωθεν is explained 
as a partitive genitive. It is, however, equally possible to take it as an 
objective genitive, referring to the conclusions generated by the premise.
Cf, the Aristotelian parallel given above, note 17. The word βελτίστη in the 
sense of "most effective" may seem unusual, but the functional connotation of 
άγαθδς is well known. The phrase as it stands is awkward, but the stylistic 
difficulties seem to me less decisive than the difficulties of interpretation 
which result from the traditional assumption of a "higher hypothesis." To 
imply, as one would have to on the old assumption, that there are many hypoth­
eses of a more universal character, any of which might be relevant to the ar­
gument, is to render the method itself almost unworkable. The plural των 
makes better sense if it can be supposed to refer to the several conclusions 
inferrable from a particular premise chosen with the assistance of common 
sense and synoptic experience.^
If we now draw the balance of the passages we have discussed, it appears 
that most of them do not tell us anything about the direction of the activity 
prompted by hypothesis. Two, perhaps three instances favor the horizontal 
perspective; here the eye focusses on the progress of the operation rather 
than on the mutual relations between the terms of the operation. One passage 
speaks for the U-perspectivej here the etymological meaning of δπδθεσις seems 
to rise more fully to the consciousness. And finally, there is no evidence of 
the A-perspective.
7It now remains to investigate some passages from the Republic« particu­
larly from the section containing the allegory of the Cave and the diagram 
of the Divided Line, These passages have been reserved for the final part 
of our discussion because they appear, at first glance, to occasion the 
greatest difficulty. It is only natural, given the perspectival connotations 
of Cave and Line, that the Platonic distinction between "up" and "down" 
should here find its most marked expression. We should, however, remember 
that this perspective refers to the distinction between levels of reality, 
or rather between reality and the various kinds of non-real, and to the 
distinction between the correlate mental activities, such as knowledge and 
belief. The method of hypothetical reasoning, on the other hand, functions 
on only one level of mental activity, and is concerned with only one level 
of reality, viz,, the Ideas (5HC1-2·), whether these Ideas be visualized in 
their pure state, as in dialectic, or less purely, as in mathematics and 
other sciences (510B4 ff.).
First, a preliminary passage. Rep. 437A6-9: ·_·* ύποθέρενοi είς τδ
πρδσθευ προίομεν, δμολογήσαντες, εάν ποτέ άλλη φαν$ ταύτα ή' τούτη, πάντα 
ήμΐν τα άπδ τούτου συμβαίνοντα λελυμένα εσεσθαι. In this concise description 
of argument on the basis of postulates, the perspective is horizontal, or at 
best undetermined. What makes the passage important is the fact that the 
quotations to be studied directly refer by and large to just such reasoning 
as is contemplated here, in language very similar to the terms used here.
Rep. 533C7 - D3i ... ή διαλεκτική μέθοδος μδνη ταύτη πορεύεται, τάς ύπο- 
θέσεις αναιρούσα, έπ αύτήν την άρχην ΐνα βεβαιώσηται, καί τζ5 <$ντι Ιν βορβδρφ
?αρβαρικξ) τινι τδ της ψυχής ομμα κατορωρυγμένον ήρέμα έλκει και άνάγει ανω ....he perspective of the operation itself is undetermined. The effect of the 
operation is to turn the mind upward from the swamp of Becoming to the exalted 
status of Reality. Analogously, the activity of dialectic is seen to lie at 
the top of the hierarchy of sciences, 534E2-4! ... δοκεΐ ... ώσπερ θριγκός
τοΐς μαθήμασιν ή διαλεκτική ήμΐν έπάνω κεϊσθαι, και ούκέτ άλλο τούτου μάθημα 
ανωτέρω δρθως άν έπιτίθεσθαι . ...^
Rep. 510Β5—9ΐ ... ψυχή ζητεϊν αναγκάζεται έξ ύποθέσεων, ούκ Ιπ’ άρχην 
πορευομένη άλλ* Ιπι την τελευτήν, τδ δ* αύ έτερον —  τδ έπ άρχην άνυπδθετον —  
Ιξ ύποθέσεως Ιουσα ... την μέθοδον ποιου^ένη. Perspective undetermined, άρχή 
and τελευτή, πορεύεσθαι and μέθοδον ποιοισθαι are relative opposites but not 
absolutely fixed topographically. Cf. 51ÖD1-3: έκ τούτων άρχδμενοι τα
λοιπά ήδη διεξιύντες τελευτωσιν ... Ιπι τούτο ου άν έπι σκέψιν δρμήσωσι.
Rep. 511A3-7S ... ύποθέσεσι δ’ άναγκαζομένην ψυχήν χρήσθαι ... ούκ Ιπ’
άρχην ιουσαV, &ς οό δυναμένην των ύποθέσεων άνωτέρω έκβαίνειν, είκδσι δε 
χρωμένημ αύτοΐς τοΐς ύπδ των κάτω άπεικασθεΐσιν .... For this analysis of 
non-dialectic hypothetical argument, cf. above, 510B5-9. There is, however, 
one difference between this statement and other statements we have discussed: 
άρχή is now distinguished from ύπδθεσις; it is equated with the άνυπδθετον. 
Mathematical demonstration is contrasted with the genuine dialectical method 
which leads to the άνυπδθετον and which is outlined in 511B3 ff. Mathemati­
cal reasoning functions on the second highest level of mental activity.
Compared with pure dialectic, it is a swamp which does not permit a man to 
get his head free. That is to say, in the hierarchy of the sciences
8mathematics is so far below dialectic that it might as well be thought to be 
located in the quagmire of belief. There is no transfer or transition 
possible between mathematical and dialectical reasoning. "To get above the 
(mathematical) hypotheses" is tantamount to entering an entirely different 
arena of logical endeavor.
Rep» 5UB5-8: ... τας ύποθέσεις ποιούμενος ούκ^άρχδς άλλα τω οντι
ύποθέσεις, οιον έπιβδσεις τε και δρμώς, ινα μέχρι του άνυποθέτου επί την του 
παντός αρχήν Ιών ... πάλιν αυ ... έπι τελευτήν καταβαίνη .... The key ex­
pressions are: ... Ιπί τήν ... αρχήν Ιών ... έπί τελευτήν καταβαίνη. Cf.
511C8-9: ... δια δε τδ μή Ιπ* άρχήν άνελθδντες σκοπεϊν. The mental activity
described is that of dialectic, as contrasted with that of mathematics and 
the inferior sciences. It is difficult to decide whether the words, and ex- 
pecially the prepositions employed in the compound verbs, refer to a vertical 
or a horizontal perspective. The horizontal or "progress of argument" sig­
nificance of ανα- and κατά-compounds is well known and has already been in­
stanced,^ τελευτή, I suspect, refers to the end of the supreme deductive 
argument, just as αρχή refers to its beginning, or to the end of the ensuing 
synthesis. What complicates the situation is the image, probably humorous, 
of the stepping stones, which seem to indicate an "up" and "down" orientation. 
And yet, if that were Plato’s conscious intention, he might well have spoken 
of higher and lower hypotheses, or he might have detailed the location of the 
άρχή vis-a-vis the other "steps" in the logical process. This he does not do. 
For the rest, the language does not differ significantly from the language of 
other passages we have discussed. The best we can say, therefore, is that 
for one moment there is promise of a vertical perspective coming out into the 
open, only to be silenced immediately by what is probably a vague assumption 
of horizontal procedure. Whether the vertical perspective lurking under the 
surface would have been a U-perspective, as is suggested by the image of the 
stepping stones, or an A-perspective, as the alternative meaning of the prepo­
sitions may indicate, is impossible say. But this very uncertainty should 
help to drive home the point that Plato is not in this context interested in 
establishing an unambiguous vertical perspective.
To repeat, when Plato, in his analysis of the Divided Line and Cave, 
talks about hypothesis, αρχή, τελευτή, etc,, his language is usually non­
committal on the score of perspective. Where he does speak of "up" and 
"down" he is ranking scientific hypotheses in the second highest division, 
below those of dialectic. Once, 511B5 ff., the ontological and epistemological 
context does, on one interpretation, seem to color the logical perspective, and 
he appears to believe that those hypotheses which bring a man closer to the 
άνυπδθετον are seen as higher than more mediate hypotheses. But we have shown 
that the language need not carry this meaning, and that the similar phrasing 
of other passages speaks against the adoption of this interpretation.
We conclude, therefore, that the evidence for Plato regarding the argu­
ment by hypothesis as leading downward from premise to inference is nil. It 
may be wondered why Plato was misunderstood so soon, notably by Aristotle,
One explanation may be that Plato provides few examples of the technique in 
action. Another may be that Plato’s followers regarded him as a metaphysician 
first and last, and could not separate his logic from his ontology. The prob­
lem calls for a close investigation.
To be read at the West Coast meeting of the Society for .ancient Greek 
Philosophy in Claremont, California, November 1958.
NOTES
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1) R. Robinson, Plato*s Earlier Dialectic^ (Oxford 1953) 136, ch. 9 #4.
2) Anal. Post. 82a23j tr. G. R. G. Mure: λέγω δ* ανω μεν την έπί το
καθόλου μάλλον, κάτω δε την έπι τδ κατά μέρος.
3) See especially Anal. Prior. 65b23î τούτο γαρ έγχωρει γενέσθαι καί 
έπι τδ ανω καί επί τδ κ&τω λαμβ&νοντι τδ συνεχές ....
4) Cf. the passage just preceding the footnote on terminology. Anal. Post.
81b38: Spa ένδέχεται άρξαμένφ άπδ τοιούτου δ' μηδενί ύπάρχει Ιτέριμ
άλλ* άλλο έκείνψ, έπι τδ ανω είς άπειρον ίέναι, θάτερον δε άρξάμενον .. 
δ'αύτδ μεν άλλου, εκείνου δε μηδέν κατηγορεϊται, έπι τδ κάτω σκοπείν 
εί ένδέχεται είς άπειρον ίέναι.
5) Anal. Post. 97a33.
6) Met. 992al8.
7) I wish to thank Professors J, B. Skemp and D. J, Allan for reading an 
earlier draft of the ms, and suggesting many valuable changes. My 
gratitude does not not, however, imply that they approve the thesis 
of this paper,
8) C. Ritter, "Platons Logik," Philologus 75 (1919) 1 ff·, and passim.
9) That "subsumption" is regularly visualized by Plato as containment, 
appears also from such passages as Gorgias 464A ff., and Theaet.
205D4: ... είς ταύτδν έμπέπτωκεν ή συλλαβή είδος έκείνφ [sc. τφ
στοιχείφ] ε’ίπερ ....
10) The word is Robinson’s, p. 95·
11) Robinson, p. 112.
12) J. Burnet, ed», Plato’s Euthyphro etc. (Oxford 1924) 51.
13) Robinson, pp„ 68 and 98.
14) It may be asked how the notion of "dependence" is naturally expressed 
in Greek. The word "dependence" itself, of course, betrays an A-pere­
spective; here the more solid or more substantial matter is pictured 
at the top. In Greek also this perspective is utilized for the notion 
of dependence and vital connexion, chiefly through the verb άρτ&ω and 
its compound άναρτάω. Herodotus, for example, uses them frequently 
in this sense. But more or less the same conception may be expressed 
via the verb κείμαι in combination with the preposition έν; and there 
the perspective is the opposite. Thus the linguistic data bearing on 
the notion of "dependence" are inconclusive on the score of perspective
10
15) In this passage, δπδθεσις has come to mean little more than πρδτασις; 
this becomes clear from the fact that in the sequel the various 
hypotheses are el- clauses. Robinson, pp. 278-280, indicates
the ways in which hypothesis in the Parmenides differs from the 
hypothetical method in the Republic. One difference on which he 
comments, with apparent surprise: "There is almost no trace in the
Pam. of the upward path of the Rep.11 Incorrect; there is no trace 
whatever. Furthermore, as we shall see later, there probably is no 
upward path in the Republic either.
16) Olympiod* in Phaed. 188 line 3 Norvin.
17) The combination of ύπδθεσυς or αρχή with the genitive, so familiar in
ontological contexts (example: Timaeus 53D4, as above), recurs in 
Aristotle’s terminology; Met. 1013al6: των αποδείξεων at δποθδσεις.
Compare also 1013b20 and Phys. 195al8: at ύποθέσεις του συμπεράσματος,
where however αΙτία is understood.
18) R« S. Bluck, in Phronesis 2 (1957) 26 asks what Plato could have meant 
by the "higher" hypothesis that is to be substituted for the hypothesis 
that turned out to be unsatisfactory. He believes that Plato is here 
thinking of the Form of the Good, i.e«, the teleological cause. He 
shrugs off the stubborn fact that Socrates had announced he was going 
to undertake a δεύτερος πλους. On rejecting the translation "higher 
hypothesis" the difficulty resolves itself.
19) F, M, Cornford’s translation of Rep. 510B4 ff« and 533C7 ff. freely 
interpolates "up" and "down," instead of reproducing the inconclusive 
perspective of the texb. H. D. P. Lee has managed to do this admir­
ably.
20) Cf. έπανήγεν, Xenophon Memor. 4«6«13> cited above, page 4» also the
use of έπανδρχομαι and έπάνειμι, Plato Para. 142B1-2, and the parallel 
use of ανω and κάτω to refer to the limits of the race course, Plato 
Rep. 613B11-12. Cf. further 0. Becker, Das Bild des Weges. Hermes 
Einzelschriften 4 (1937) index, s.v, χαταβαίνω, and LSJ s.v. Ανέρχομαι, 
II.2,
